The flourishing of late-antique studies in the last half-century has coincided with the rise of "world history" as an area of academic research. To an extent, some overlap has occurred, particularly with Sasanian Persia being considered alongside the late Roman Empire as constituting an essential component in what we think of in terms of the "shape" of late antiquity.
Introduction
This article offers an unashamedly personal set of challenges to conventional approaches to the study of late antiquity. In particular, it recommends that some of the impasses that currently bedevil debates in the discipline might be overcome by adopting a more world-historical 2 approach to the subject. By that I mean not only seeing the history of late antiquity in a wider geographical perspective, but also a viewpoint that adopts an ethical stance that challenges the current paradigms within which late antiquity is debated: as will be argued below, conventional accounts of the period focus their narratives around the experiences of the Roman Empire and, therefore, articulate an essentially Western and Eurocentric interpretation of historical development. Of course, many specialists in the field are already making significant advances away from this western-dominated narrative; nevertheless, it strikes me as a worthwhile exercise to draw the strands of the debate together and to offer pointers to possible future directions.
Given the scope of the undertaking implicit in this recommendation, the enquiry presented here can only offer a brief overview of the themes and issues I want to contest: the examples cited below could be multiplied exponentially, 1 and I aim to investigate many of the issues in more detail in the future. In other words, what is presented here is only the beginning of a larger project. I should also clarify that the outcomes of what I suggest here might take many forms. I have written this article mainly with an eye to research agendas; but there is no reason why some of the perspectives recommended here could not also be imported into a classroom setting, where they would surely provoke interesting discussions. But to begin with,
and in order to demonstrate how ingrained the conventional approaches I wish to challenge have become, I present a narrative that will seem, at first, wholly familiar.
A victory had been won and the ruler wanted to celebrate it. The barbarians, true to form, had been duplicitous and had broken the treaty. Now a great hosting of them (Goths, Germans, and others) had invaded the empire, but they were no match for the empire's forces and had been utterly defeated. Many of the enemy had been slain in bloody vengeance for their treacherous behaviour in starting the war. More importantly, many of their leading men had been captured; best of all, their king had been captured alive. He would make a fine ornament for the ruler's victory celebrations at his capital, a living example of the ruler's indomitable power, a figure to be humiliated and put on public display. Such a great victory also deserved a permanent 3 commemoration in text and image, so reliefs and inscriptions were set up showing the ruler in all his might lording it over his abject, cowering foe.
Such images are familiar to us from Roman imperial and late-antique monuments, like the reliefs from the now lost triumphal monument of Marcus Aurelius or from the extant arch of Septimius Severus in Rome, or those that decorate the obelisk base of Theodosius I in the hippodrome in Constantinople. 2 But the set of victories and commemorations I have been describing so far do not come from that familiar context. Rather, the triumphant ruler was Shapur I, shahanshah of Sasanian Persia; the defeated barbarians were the Romans; and the captive king the Emperor Valerian in 260. For humiliating display, I have in mind the tradition that Shapur used Valerian as a stool when mounting his horse or getting into his carriage, and that later, when the emperor died, his corpse was flayed and his skin tanned to provide a more permanent trophy. 3 As for the epigraphic and visual commemorations, I mean the so-called Res Gestae Divi Saporis, the great trilingual inscription recording Shapur's victories, and the rock reliefs at Naqsh-i Rustam and Bishapur, showing his triumph over not only Valerian, but Gordian III and Philip the Arab too. 4 If, however, anyone steeped in Roman imperial or late-antique history had assumed that my earlier description alluded to the victories of a Marcus, Severus, or Theodosius, their misapprehension would be wholly understandable, for they have been conditioned to think of a world centred on Rome, Constantinople, and the Mediterranean.
That this should be the case attests to the profound influence on modern perceptions of a supposedly "normative" world view underwritten by traditional, classical geographical divisions of the world into a civilized centre and barbaric periphery. 5 In this traditional schema, Persians, like other non-Romans, inhabit the margins of the map. Such a world-view underpins classical and classicising historiography, and can be found, for instance, in the fourth-century Latin historian Ammianus Marcellinus' celebrated description of the Huns as being "abnormally savage" and living "beyond the Maeotic sea, near the frozen ocean". He goes on to catalogue their lifestyle in a form that reads like a negative checklist of the accoutrements of civilization as 4 it was viewed by the Greeks and Romans: the Huns lack every marker of civilized life, from fire, to cities, to politics, and are only acknowledged begrudgingly as human. They are, therefore, doubly remote from civilization, in terms of both their geographical distance and their lack of cultural attainments. 6 But the achievements of Shapur I, and his epigraphic and monumental commemoration of them, remind us that other perspectives, not centred on the classical Mediterranean, are possible -and it is these perspectives that I want to explore here. I will organise my reflections as follows. First I will offer a survey of late-antique perspectives on the world, showing their variety and complexity, and how they demonstrate that the Mediterranean-centred perspective of classical and classicising historiography is not the only view possible. Next, I will discuss how the traditional shape of late antiquity has been made to fit into a customary western, and essentially Eurocentric, view of history -and how this might be regarded as deeply problematic. The final part of the paper will consider how that traditional view might be challenged by adopting an approach that is more sensitive both to the multiple local perspectives outlined in the first part of the discussion and to global contexts; this in turn will show how, by advocating a more worldhistorical perspective on events, we can challenge traditional narratives of the period, and see events in a new light.
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A variety of perspectives
The ancients knew, of course, that there was a wider word beyond that in which they lived, and, You are at war with many peoples, we with you alone: thus the necessity of the treaty.
Just as the Romans would be certain to prevail if they were fighting either a number of tribes or the Persian kingdom alone, so we shall certainly conquer since we have a dispute with no one but the Romans and since we are committed to only one war. 9 These two accounts, from two centuries apart, essentially tell the same story: the rivalry between Rome and Persia in the Middle East was determined not solely by events along the specific frontier that separated them, but by events across a wider geographical arena: distractions of the there are notices of barbarians invading the Iberian peninsula, of the disease that followed in the wake of these of upheavals, and then a long discursive passage that analyses those events in apocalyptic terms: all told, the Spanish passage is almost three times as long as the entry on Alaric at Rome. 15 It is important to bear in mind, of course, that Hydatius's narrative is coloured by his own particular perspective on events, in particular his apocalyptic outlook and sense that he was, in some way, writing a history of the end of the world. 16 The narrative of Hydatius -by highlighting events in Spain over those at Romepresents an unfamiliar perspective, in which events like the sack of Rome that are central to conventional grand narratives of late antiquity are passed over relatively quickly in favour of detailed accounts of more local history. If, from a viewpoint centred on the Mediterranean, Spain might seem marginal, the effect of using a non-metropolitan source like Hydatius is to offer a 8 different perspective opposed to that master narrative. The perspective offered by PseudoJoshua similarly presents a view from the periphery, but considered alongside a rich tradition of Syriac literature, makes even more emphatic than Hydatius the point that such "peripheries" can be considered as "centers" in their own right: it is possible to write a history of the frontier in Syria that sees it as central, and the Roman and Persian empires as marginal; a broadly similar case can be adumbrated for Armenia. 17 These myriad local perspectives therefore present an opportunity to challenge the traditional account of late antiquity with its Mediterranean-focussed overarching grand narrative. It is to this theme that I now turn.
Grand narratives (i) The End of the World: Sources and Narrative Choices
Why have events at Rome in 410 traditionally commanded our attention more than those in Spain? In part, it reflects the perspectives of some contemporaries, who saw the Gothic sack in particularly portentous terms. A vivid account offered by Jerome recounts his emotional turmoil when he received news that "the city that had taken the whole world was itself taken." endings took a little longer to become established. 21 Moreover, when it came to be expressed, by the chronicler Marcellinus Comes in the sixth century, it was motivated by different concerns 9 from those that had motivated Jerome and Prosper. For Marcellinus, the deposition of the "last"
western emperor Romulus Augustulus in 476 could be presented in symbolic terms:
With this Augustulus perished the Western empire of the Roman people, which the first Augustus, Octavian, began to rule in the seven hundred and ninth year from the foundation of the city. This occurred in the five hundred and twenty-second year of the kingdom of the departed emperors, with Gothic kings thereafter holding Rome. 22 As Brian Croke has shown, this presentation was calibrated to the concerns of an eastern establishment contemplating reconquest of the lost western provinces, and for whom it made sense to manufacture 476 as a turning point and to rewrite half-a-century's worth of diplomatic relations between Constantinople and Italy in order to provide a pretext for Justinian's western wars. 23 By contrast, contemporary responses in 476 to the deposition of Romulus had been more sanguine, even at Constantinople. A fragment of Malchus of Philadelpia's history reports that when a delegation from the senate of Rome came to the eastern emperor Zeno to report the deposition of Romulus and claim that one emperor would be enough for them, Zeno dismissed them with the response that they still had an emperor: Julius Nepos, who had been sent to Italy in 473, deposed a year later, but was still claiming to rule "the West" from Dalmatia. 24 So far as Zeno was concerned, the western empire was not dead yet. 
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Not everyone has agreed: in a pungent rejoinder, Michael Kulikowski has asserted that "Heather's idée fixe -that the Huns were responsible for the fall of the Roman empire and the end of the ancient world -is simple, elegant, and wrong." 26 The very debate about the significance of events such as those in 376, 378, 410, 476 and numerous others is instructive. In one sense it is depressingly so, in that it suggests that the major chronological nodes of the debate have moved on little since Edward Gibbon penned his
History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire more than two hundred years ago. I will return to
Gibbon presently, but for the moment let me also suggest that it is instructive of the point I made earlier in connection with my slightly devious presentation of the victories of Shapur Inamely, that such views reflect the dominance of a select number of sources, whose perspectives reflect what are regarded as 'normative', metropolitan views on our conception of the grand narrative of the period: Jerome, lamenting the capture of the city that had captured the world, was, memorably, more Ciceronian than Christian; 27 Prosper, who passed judgement of the end of Roman Carthage, may have been from Aquitaine, but was an enthusiastic supporter of the Roman papacy and its claims to primacy; 28 and Marcellinus, as we saw, is representative of coalescing opinion at sixth-century Constantinople. In other words, by prioritising their perspectives, and the sort of narrative they imply, we are relegating to the margins the sort of view on events presented by authors like Hydatius and Pseudo-Joshua. But is such marginalisation acceptable? I would contend that it is deeply problematic, since it implies complicity in a particular view of history. 29 Let me return now to Gibbon.
(ii) Decline Christendom.
In the decades that followed, it is clear that excited acclamation overtook regretful contemplation. In 1996, for example, Glen Bowersock remarked that "it is probably fair to say that no responsible historian of the ancient or medieval world would want to address or acknowledge the fall of Rome as either fact or paradigm"; and that "[t]he fall of Rome is no longer needed, and like the writing on a faded papyrus, it no longer speaks to us." 32 More recently, Edward James remarked with trenchant optimism that "'Decline' has been banned from the … vocabulary" of scholars working in the field. 33 Such assertions might be taken as indicating that Gibbon's views had been consigned to the historiographical scrap heap, and that any restatement of them is at best old-fashioned (perhaps even irresponsible). But there are good reasons for regarding that optimism as having been misplaced. For in fact, the last fifteen years have seen renewed interest in decline and fall as hermeneutical tools with which to interpret late antiquity. Works like that by Ward-Perkins, and that of Peter Heather mentioned earlier, seem to suggest a resurgence of an essentially Gibbonian view of history, and indeed have been characterised as regressive. 37 At one level, this might mean little more than that the pendulum of historical opinion is swinging back against Brown and his disciples. 38 But I think there is something rather more than that at stake. In short, it seems to me insistence on decline and fall reflects a particularly prejudiced perspective on the end of the ancient world and emergence of the middle ages. 39 We need to return to Gibbon to see what I mean.
To Gibbon, and for all his efforts to encompass Byzantium and Islam in his narrative, 40 the demise of the Roman empire was first and foremost an event significant in western European history. That significance is implicit throughout much of his narrative, but in his "General considerations on the decline of the empire in the west" that concluded volume 3 of 13 his history, Gibbon made this European dimension explicit by considering how a similar chain of events might impact on the Europe of his own day. 41 When the final volume of Decline and
Fall was published in 1788, Gibbon was probably content that his image of a civilization brought low by the irruption of external factors -alien peoples, the barbarians, and an alien creed, Christianity -was a reasoned one. But almost immediately there were to unfold events that were to cause Gibbon to think of other factors that he had omitted from consideration. As France was thrown into the convulsive horrors of revolution, Gibbon was forced to the realisation that some central tenets of his History were seriously mistaken. In particular, the events in France made him wonder if he had seriously underestimated the significance of internal revolts and civil wars in the undermining of the empire. In papers prepared for an unrealised seventh volume of see below) on late antiquity and the early middle ages, and which has had an enduring impact on the very structures we impose on the past (for example, through periodization, in which "the fall of Rome" is a hinge moment), is deeply problematic. It belongs to a style of analysing the past that has been characterised by the anthropologist Jack Goody as amounting to a European theft of history, where the experiences of Europe provide the central framework within which the totality of history is interpreted, and where the central concern of historians is largely focussed on Europe (particularly north-western Europe). 43 Goody's characterisation of how western Ireland that lay outside the purview of CAH 14. In both cases, the geographical focus of these compendia is shaped by their narrative concerns: the CAH is clearly shaped by the world that has gone before, and reflects a world view that encompasses, and saw as central, the Near East and the southern shores of the Mediterranean; the NCMH, by contrast, is clearly shaped by the world that is to come: a world focused on the medieval civilization of, above all, Europe. 45 The medieval histories of Near Eastern territories and North Africa belong elsewhere. 46 In this respect, we can see one influence of Goody's Western theft of history, in that as we move from antiquity to the middle ages we also move inexorably westwards (and northwards)
to an emphatically European history. That is not to say that such a vision has not been challenged. Peter Sarris' recent overview of the period 500-700, published somewhat incongruously in the "Oxford History of Medieval Europe", is altogether more wide-ranging in its geographical vision than many comparable histories (including NCMH 1). 47 As Christopher
Kelly pointed out in his review of Sarris, "It is easy for forget that this is hard-fought territory, disputed by fractious experts and partitioned between different university departments." 48 Here
we gain a glimpse of how fraught a task is any effort to challenge, for late antiquity, the Western 15 theft of history identified by Goody: anyone seeking to issue such a challenge would need to overcome deep-rooted academic and institutional divisions.
(iv) Narratives, Progress, and Analogy
Another feature of this western construct of history noted by Goody is its insistence on progress as an essentially upward curve from "the dawn of civilization" through to modern industrial capitalism. In any such narrative, the end of the ancient world seems to represent a disruption of that upward curve, and the recent restatements of decline and fall have noted this. For instance, in 1996, the Italian scholar Aldo Schiavone, in an account of the lack of a seamless progression from the ancient to modern world, noted that the study of late antiquity (particular the Brownian late antiquity with its emphasis on transformation) was a valuable enterprise: i t presented the historian with "an entirely new universe … in which simplistic and teleological explanations have no part". At the same time, however, he suggested that it "tends to overshadow an essential point", by "downplaying the disruptive and catastrophic aspects of the changeover" between antiquity and the Middle Ages, a process that he described in a memorable phrase as a "historical thrombosis". 49 In Schiavone's view, the roots of Rome's fall were to be sought in the structure of its economy, in particular the reliance on slave labour for productivity. Such an economy, he argued, had no inherent growth mechanism; as a result, it could only expand so far and no further, and its ultimate collapse was in many respects inevitable. 50 Ward-Perkins' The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization is, I think, even more embroiled in this western narrative of progress and its disruption -and it is precisely this disruption to progress that allows him to present the late-antique/early-medieval transition in such bleak terms. He makes frequent use of analogy to draw attention to the complexity of the Roman system in the period before the "Germanic invasions." Such analogies contribute to a picture of Roman imperial civilization that risks distorting by stressing its inherent modernity. 16 We are repeatedly told that the use of some commodity -such as metals, roof tiles, pottery, bricks, and even literacy -was not to be paralleled in Europe until the late-medieval or modern period. 51 In other words, the fall of Rome is presented as a disruption of that essentially progressive model of western history. 
Late Antiquity and World History
In the last section of this article, I want to examine the potential of considering late antiquity against such a wider world-historical background. 58 In Anglophone scholarship, the Eurocentric tendency can be seen among both those scholars who approach late antiquity by moving forward from classical, Graeco-Roman antiquity into the fourth century and beyond; 59 and those who take their starting point with the developed institutions of medieval Christendom and then move backwards in search of their origins. 60 In both of these cases, late antiquity is defined in relation to other periods as part of a particular narrative plot -as either a sequel during which the heritage of classical antiquity was transformed into something else (mainly conceived of in terms of western culture); or as a prequel during which the forms of medieval culture coalesced from the raw materials of an earlier age.
Consequently it is unsurprising that there has been some difficulty in arriving at an agreed definition of the chronological parameters of late antiquity, beyond a vague consensus that it falls somewhere in the middle of the first millennium: even Brown's programmatic World of Late Antiquity is vague on this, in spite of his advertised limits of Marcus Aurelius and Muhammad. 61 One result of this has been a resistance to what Andrea Giardina has diagnosed as an 'elephantiasis' of late antiquity, in which the label is applied to a period that stretches ever further backwards into the Roman imperial period and forwards into the middle ages. 62 Objections to this "long" late antiquity include those who are interested in different narrative plots, and who feel that these are obscured by the focus on the late antique: Averil Cameron has recently raised precisely this sort of concern from the perspective of Byzantinists. 63 But this highlights an important issue: in large measure, chronological definitions (which traditionally have derived from political history, and so are difficult to delineate precisely for processes of cultural change)
will always involve an element of subjectivity, depending on the narrative being constructed and the actors involved. 64 
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Related to this is another point, and that relates not to when late antiquity was, but where it was. Geographical considerations will often depend on the particular emphases of a narrative.
For instance, Garth Fowden proposed over twenty years ago that the stage for Romano-Persian conflicts in late antiquity, and their ideological (particularly religious) consequences, encompassed a vast "mountain arena", stretching from Axum in Ethiopia to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan, from Yemen and Arabia to the Caucasus and the Caspian; his recent argument in favour of considering the first millennium as a chronological unit has restated, refined, and elaborated this geographical context, now cast as the "Eurasian hinge". 65 But this geographical focus depends on the story he wishes to tell, which in his recent restatement clusters around the development and maturation of monotheistic religious traditions in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; and it has its costs, as can be seen in his characterisation of Latin Christendom in Western Europe as backward and underdeveloped. 66 This means that cultural definitions of particular late-antique narratives can result in the exclusion from them of particular regions. At one level, this is understandable, since a particular argument requires a particular focus. But it results in a situation pithily described by Guy Halsall as one in which "Late Antiquity was just something that happened to other people", for example by excluding from the narrative the inhabitants of Ireland or barbarian Europe. 67 Just as much as periodization and narrative plots, the definitions of "central" regions (be they Brogiolo and Ward-Perkins' "Graeco-Roman Mediterranean" or Fowden's "Eurasian hinge") involve a series of subjective choices.
So how can other regions be integrated into a wider world history of late antiquity? One is to acknowledge interconnections between the various parts of the world in the late antique period (however we define it). By this I mean more than just traceable connections (to which I will return below), but also ones that determined the development of cultures and societies. In the essay by Halsall alluded to a moment ago, he argues that the development of societies abutting Rome's European frontiers is such that one might argue that "Germanic-speaking barbaricum 20 was, perhaps paradoxically, more integrally a part of the Roman Empire than many of the imperial provinces." 68 But examining states bordering on the Empire through a Roman lens can bring its own risks, for example by highlighting features of non-Roman societies that resemble those found within the Empire to the exclusion of others. An important paper by Michael
Morony on Sasanian Iran might seem to have done precisely that, by considering the extent to which the Persian empire resembled the Roman across a range of categories, such as political structure, religious profile, and military factors. But his intent was vigorous advocacy of the inclusion of the Sasanian polity as an integral part of the late antique world, and was conceived of in response to overly Romanocentric notions of what constitutes late antiquity. 69 While this might seem to subsume the Sasanians into an explicitly western view of history, it has its uses beyond advocacy, since highlighting similarities between cultures and societies can allow for meaningful comparisons to be made. 70 But as I hope to show now, we can go rather further than that.
(ii) Global Perspectives on Late Antiquity I want to bring this article to a close by suggesting that a broader, global vista might allow us to put the late-antique experience of the Roman world in a more meaningful perspective than the traditional Mediterranean focus allows; and that such a perspective might allow us to ask useful questions about what we do when we study late antiquity. I should state very clearly that I am not pretending that no-one has attempted such an approach. An instructive example is provided by Giusto Traina's study of the year 428, which takes its reader on a grand tour of the world, from Persia around the provinces of the Roman world (and, in some cases, the territories of a post-imperial west) and back again. 71 The approach adopted in Traina's book bears comparison III, appealed to the emperor of China for help. 81 The world was certainly interconnected -but those interconnections could be haphazard and piecemeal.
We need, moreover, to allow that individual interactions, while they might be linked to Individual details of al-Tabari's account might be questioned -but there is enough archaeological evidence to suggest that Sasanian influence on Arabia, particularly in the East and South, was indeed profound. 83 More importantly for my purposes here, this is a campaign that leaves no trace whatsoever in the Greek and Latin sources of the period, and as such opens our eyes to a history in which Rome plays no part. 91 What has customarily been considered in predominantly western terms emerges instead, from a more global perspective, to be one of a number of concurrent (and possibly interconnected) processes affecting a wide sweep of territory and a great number of polities.
By looking across this much broader geographical canvas, we might consider other factors that afflicted not only the Roman world, but adjacent territories too. Recent work on the palaeoenvironmental history of Eurasia is beginning to suggest that factors completely separate from invasion and war were having an impact on the transformation of society. 92 It is relatively uncontroversial to state that the end of the ancient world witnessed a contraction of economic activity. In large measure, the dismemberment of the Roman Empire played a key role in this process, since there was simply no longer a need for a sophisticated market economy whose chief raison d'être had been the maintenance of Rome's fiscal and military apparatus. But recent research is beginning to suggest some types of economic decline were to be found not only within the Empire, but also further afield. For instance, studies of pollen samples from archaeological excavations in Poland suggest a contraction of cereal production there in the fifth century that is directly comparable to situations in territories that were (or recently had been) in the Roman Empire. That strongly suggests that war and upheaval were not the only factors underlying change, and new archaeological material is beginning to hint at other possible answers. Analysis of alluvial deposits in the Rhône valley suggests a period of considerable 25 climatic upheaval between the fourth century and the seventh: rainfall increased dramatically, and it seems likely that agricultural productivity will have declined drastically over an extended period. Similar evidence is beginning to be yielded by study of the advances and retreats of Alpine glaciers. Between the late-fifth century and until the seventh, a number of these seem to have expanded considerably. 93 Taken together with the evidence of alluvial deposits in the Rhône valley, and numerous references in historical documentation for the period, not least the widespread references to the 'years without summer' in the mid-sixth century (presumably the consequence of some sort of volcanic event), 94 the seemingly inescapable conclusion is that the end of antiquity and the dawn of the middle ages was accompanied by much colder and wetter climatic conditions across much of Eurasia. Given the vulnerability of pre-modern agricultures to small shifts in temperature, there is reason to think that these changed climatic conditions could have had a devastating impact. 95 To such ecological factors we might also add disease. Just as ancient agriculture was fragile, so too was ancient demography, meaning that major epidemics were likely to have significant, far-reaching consequences. And the end of the ancient world was accompanied by just such an epidemic: the so-called Justinianic plague, first observed at Pelusium in the Nile Delta in 541, and which recurred throughout the Mediterranean world, the Near East, and northern Europe for some two centuries. The plague had long been known from grim accounts in sources ranging from Arabia to Ireland that stressed almost incomprehensible levels of suffering and mortality. Historians have justifiably been wary of taking such accounts at face value, but recent work on this pandemic is beginning to suggest that its impact was indeed profound. Comparison of the late ancient accounts of the disease with modern studies of epidemiology would appear to confirm that the epidemic is our first attested incidence of bubonic plague. Its impact can be seen across a range of phenomena, including contractions of economy and settlement, and demographic decline. Such considerations suggest that plague may have been a more decisive factor in the fortunes of the eastern Roman Empire than the Arab 26 invasions of its territory in the seventh century. 96 Moreover, plague was not the only disease to afflict late ancient populations. Throughout antiquity and the middle ages, malaria was a major threat to the health of Mediterranean populations; when it occurred concurrently with plague, the impact could be devastating. 97 In combination, these ecological and demographic factors likely had a profound impact on society, not just in the Roman and post-Roman Mediterranean, but also more widely across Eurasia. 98 Plainly, the barbarian invasions do not explain everything;
nor can events in the Roman world be understood in isolation.
Conclusions: risks and prospects
This paper has argued that any evaluation of the transformations of late antiquity need to resist This is not to say that there are not difficulties associated with the sort of global late antiquity project outlined here. One obvious problem -and one that I freely admit I am in no position to surmount -is that such an undertaking would require a mastery of the histories of a wide range of cultures, not to mention their multiplicity of languages; 99 as such, a project of the sort recommended here might best be undertaken as a collaborative effort. 100 Other difficulties in adopting a global perspective are that more local histories might get neglected, 101 
